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SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
                           INTRODUCTION 
         Before the in banc court is an appeal by NationsBank of 
Tennessee (Collateral Trustee) and New Jersey National Bank, 
Harris Trust and Savings Bank, and Boatman's First National Bank 
of Oklahoma (First, Second, and Third Priority Secured Equipment 
Certificate Trustees), who are collectively referred to in this 
opinion as the "Trustees," from the order entered by the district 
court in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding of Continental 
Airlines, Inc. dismissing as "moot" three appeals by the 
Trustees.  Those appeals were from orders of the bankruptcy court 
which 1) denied the Trustees' Renewed Motion for adequate 
protection, 2) confirmed Continental's revised second amended 
joint plan of reorganization, and 3) denied the Trustees' motion 
for the establishment of a cash deposit of $123,479,287.  In 
essence, the Appellant Trustees seek payment for an asserted 
administrative claim of approximately $117 million against the 
reorganized company.  The Appellee, Continental Airlines, Inc., 
defends the district court's decision to dismiss the Trustees' 
appeal and argues, in the alternative, that the underlying 
rulings of the bankruptcy court were correct as a matter of law 
and fact.   
                               I.   
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
         Continental filed its Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on 
December 3, 1990.  Appellant Trustees serve as successor 
Collateral and Series Trustees for certificate holders who had 
provided Continental with operating capital.  The certificates 
were secured at the time of Continental's petition by a pool of 
29 commercial aircraft with engines, and 81 additional jet 
engines which, we were advised, serviced about one-third of 
Continental's operating fleet.  Under the Bankruptcy Code, the 
debtor in possession, which has most of the rights, powers, 
functions and duties of a trustee, see 11 U.S.C.  1107(a), "may 
use property of the estate in the ordinary course of business 
without notice or a hearing."  11 U.S.C.  363(c)(1).   
         Section 363(e) provides:  
         Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at 
         any time, on request of an entity that has an interest 
         in property used . . . by the [debtor in possession], 
         the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or 
         condition such use . . . as is necessary to provide 
         adequate protection of such interest.   
11 U.S.C.  363(e). 
         On February 21, 1991, First Fidelity Bank of New 
Jersey, predecessor to NationsBank as Collateral Trustee, filed a 
motion along with many other aircraft lessors and financiers 
alleging, inter alia, a decline in the value of the collateral 
and seeking adequate protection under section 363(e).  First 
Fidelity later withdrew from this motion, but on June 28, 1991 
it, and the predecessors of the other Appellant Trustees, filed a 
motion seeking similar relief.  The bankruptcy court held an 
evidentiary hearing on the motion from September 3 through 
September 6, 1991 limited to the Trustees' assertion that they 
were entitled to adequate protection payments as a result of the 
collateral's post-petition decline in market value.   
         Continental argued, inter alia, that because the 
Trustees had not filed a motion for relief from the automatic 
stay, they were not entitled to an award of adequate protection 
under section 363(e).  The motion remained pending in the 
bankruptcy court until August 27, 1992 when the court ruled on 
the Trustees' motion, rejecting Continental's legal argument but 
finding as a fact, based on the "Blue Books," a publication 
issued by a company that appraises aircraft, that the market 
value of the collateral had not declined during the period at 
issue in the motion.  In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 146 B.R. 
536 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992) [hereinafter Continental I].    
         Approximately two weeks before the bankruptcy court 
issued that opinion, the Trustees filed their first motion under 
section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to lift the automatic stay 
("Lift-Stay Motion").  See 11 U.S.C.  362(d).  This section 
permits a creditor to move for relief from the automatic stay of 
delineated activities, such as repossession of collateral, 
effected by section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.   
          
         On September 14, 1992, the Trustees also filed a 
renewed motion for adequate protection for alleged decline in the 
collateral's value for the period after September 1991, when the 
original 1991 motion was argued ("Renewed Motion").  There were 
various hearings on the Renewed Motion between November 3, 1992 
and February 5, 1993.  Toward the end of that period, the 
Trustees filed a motion dated January 29, 1993, asking the 
bankruptcy court to establish a cash deposit of some $123 
million, of which $117 million was attributable to alleged market 
decline, to preserve what the Trustees claimed was the 
administrative priority status of the Trustees' adequate 
protection claim if Continental emerged from bankruptcy as a 
reorganized debtor ("Deposit Motion").   
         During this period efforts to reorganize the debtor 
continued.  On November 9, 1992 Continental entered into an 
Investment Agreement under which the Investors (Air Partners, 
L.P. and Air Canada) agreed and committed to an investment of 
$450 million in the reorganized entity under a complex 
arrangement and subject to certain conditions.  App. at 391 et 
seq.  One of those conditions, and the one most relevant to this 
proceeding, was a limitation on the amount and nature of 
liabilities and administrative expense claims required to be 
assumed by or attributable to the reorganized company.  App. at 
408.  On January 13, 1993 Continental filed a second amended 
joint plan of reorganization ("Plan") which referenced that 
Investment Agreement.  The Plan provided, inter alia, for 
assumption of "allowed administrative claims" by the reorganized 
Continental.  App. at 656.       
         The confirmation hearing was held for a number of days 
during the period March 16, 1993 through April 16, 1993.  The 
parties reached a settlement on April 12 concerning adequate 
protection due to use and/or maintenance of the collateral by 
Continental, and no issue relating to use decline (the impairment 
in value attributable to the use of the collateral by the debtor 
in possession) is before us.  However, the parties did not settle 
the Trustees' adequate protection claims based on decline in 
market value.   
         At the conclusion of the confirmation hearing on April 
16, 1993, the bankruptcy court denied the Deposit Motion and the 
Renewed Motion.  In a published opinion, the bankruptcy court 
held that it was necessary for the Trustees to have sought relief 
from the automatic stay to be entitled to adequate protection for 
market value decline; that therefore the Trustees were not 
entitled to adequate protection due to market decline until after 
the date of their Lift-Stay Motion, i.e. August 14, 1992; and 
that no decline in the market value of the collateral had taken 
place since that date.  In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 154 
B.R. 176 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993) [hereinafter Continental II].  
Also on April 16, 1993, the bankruptcy court signed the 
Confirmation Order.  The court made a series of detailed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law underlying the Confirmation Order 
which will be referred to throughout this opinion when pertinent. 
         On April 20, 1993 the Trustees filed three notices of 
appeal to the district court from the bankruptcy court's denial 
of the Renewed Motion for Adequate Protection, its denial of the 
Deposit Motion, and its order confirming the Plan.  Two days 
later, the Trustees filed a motion for a partial stay of the 
consummation of the Plan ("Conditional Stay Motion"), but filed 
that motion in the district court, which referred them to the 
bankruptcy court.  On April 26, 1993, the Trustees filed that 
stay request in the bankruptcy court.  Because the bankruptcy 
judge was not available, the hearing on the motion was held the 
next day in the district court, which stated, without explanation 
or analysis, that the Trustees were likely to prevail on their 
appeal to the district court, but denied the stay because the  
 
Trustees were "unable to post a bond satisfactory to the Court."  
App. at 1755-56.  The Trustees did not then make any effort to 
seek any emergency relief from this court.  With no stay impeding 
implementation of the Plan which had now been confirmed, the 
Investors proceeded to close the transaction by making their 
promised investment. 
         On May 6, 1993 Continental filed a motion in the 
district court to dismiss the Trustees' appeals as moot, which  
the district court granted on December 30, 1993.  The Trustees 
filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration in light of the 
decision in Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co., Inc. (In re 
Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944 (2d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter 
Chateaugay II], which the court denied.  The Trustees then filed 
a timely notice of appeal.  This court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C.  158(d). 
         A panel of this court heard argument on September 15, 
1995 and issued an opinion that affirmed the district court's 
order by a two-to-one vote.  The Trustees petitioned for 
rehearing, and the in banc court voted to rehear the appeal.  
Under this court's Internal Operating Procedures, the opinion of 
the panel issued February 7, 1996 was withdrawn. 
 
                               II. 
                            DISCUSSION 
                                A. 
         This court has not addressed the interesting and 
challenging questions raised by the bankruptcy court's holding 
that a creditor must file a motion to lift the automatic stay as 
a prerequisite to seeking adequate protection.  The Trustees 
argue that the bankruptcy court erred as a matter of law and that 
this court can decide the issue de novo even though it was not 
reached by the district court.  They further argue that the 
bankruptcy court's finding that there was no diminution in the 
market value of the Trustees' collateral after they filed their 
Lift-Stay Motion was clearly erroneous.  Finally, they argue that 
the bankruptcy court erred as a matter of law in denying their 
motion for the establishment of a cash deposit.  
         Not surprisingly, Continental, as appellee, defends 
both the bankruptcy court's legal determination that the Trustees 
could not assert adequate protection claims for alleged market 
value decline during the period before they moved for relief from 
the automatic stay and its factual conclusion that there had been 
no substantial decline in the value of the collateral since the 
Lift-Stay Motion was filed.  Finally, it argues that in any event 
the Trustees could not recover for adequate protection because 
the value of the collateral did not decline below its value on 
the petition date, which Continental contends is the relevant 
measure.  
         We would reach these issues only if we were satisfied 
that the district court erred in holding that the Trustees' 
appeals to it were "moot," a decision as to which the parties  
vigorously disagree.  Mootness vel non of the appeals before the 
district court is closely related to, if not indistinguishable 
from, the question whether the appeal to this court is moot, an 
issue which Continental alludes to in its brief.  For 
convenience, we will refer to mootness in the district court 
unless we state otherwise. 
         Continental does not contend that the appeals to the 
district court or to us were moot in the constitutional sense, 
implicating the case or controversy requirement of Article III,  
1.  See, e.g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1975).  
This is not a situation analogous to those where the Supreme 
Court determined that the appeals became moot because the law at 
issue was repealed, see Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 
404 U.S. 412, 414-15 (1972); the subject of the election campaign 
controversy was no longer a candidate, see Golden v. Zwickler, 
394 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1969); or the railroad whose application 
for tariffs was contested withdrew that application, see A.L. 
Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 U.S. 324, 329-30 
(1961).  
         Indeed, as the Supreme Court has recently explained, an 
appeal is moot in the constitutional sense only if events have 
taken place during the pendency of the appeal that make it 
"impossible for the court to grant 'any effectual relief 
whatever.'"  Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 
12, 113 S. Ct. 447, 449 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 
651, 653 (1895)).  An appeal is not moot "merely because a court 
cannot restore the parties to the status quo ante.  Rather, when 
a court can fashion 'some form of meaningful relief,' even if it 
only partially redresses the grievances of the prevailing party, 
the appeal is not moot."  RTC v. Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc. (In 
re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc.), 16 F.3d 552, 560 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(in banc) (quoting Church of Scientology, 113 S. Ct. at 450). 
Thus, in Isidor Paiewonsky Associates v. Sharp Properties, Inc., 
998 F.2d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 1993), we concluded that because we 
could impose at least one of the remedies enumerated by the 
appellant, and thereby provide it "some effective relief," the 
appeal was not moot.  See also Swedeland, 16 F.3d at 559-60.  
That is not the issue in this case.  
         Instead, Continental invokes the broader interpretation 
of mootness applied in bankruptcy cases, often referred to as 
"equitable mootness."  See, e.g., Manges v. Seattle-First Nat'l 
Bank (In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.denied, 
115 S. Ct. 1105 (1995); In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 
F.3d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 1993); Official Comm. of Unsecured  
Creditors of LTV Aerospace & Defense Co. v. Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors of LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 
988 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Chateaugay I];  
Rochman v. Northeast Utils. Serv. Group (In re Public Serv. Co.), 
963 F.2d 469, 471-72 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908 
(1992); First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortgage Invs. v. Club 
Assocs. (In re Club Assocs.), 956 F.2d 1065, 1069 (11th Cir. 
1992); Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund 
v. Central Transp., Inc., 841 F.2d 92, 95-96 (4th Cir. 1988); In 
re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Trone v. 
Roberts Farms, Inc. (In re Roberts Farms, Inc.), 652 F.2d 793, 
796-97 (9th Cir. 1981).  Under this widely recognized and 
accepted doctrine, the courts have held that "[a]n appeal should 
. . . be dismissed as moot when, even though effective relief 
could conceivably be fashioned, implementation of that relief 
would be inequitable."  Chateaugay I, 988 F.2d at 325. 
         The use of the word "mootness" as a shortcut for a 
court's decision that the fait accompli of a plan confirmation 
should preclude further judicial proceedings has led to 
unfortunate confusion.  In a trenchant discussion of the issue in 
a recent decision of the Seventh Circuit, the court noted that 
denominating the doctrine as "equitable mootness" is misleading.  
In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 
S. Ct. 509 (1994).  Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, 
stated:  "[t]here is a big difference between inability to alter 
the outcome (real mootness) and unwillingness to alter the 
outcome ('equitable mootness').  Using one word for two different 
concepts breeds confusion." Id. (emphasis in original).  Thus, 
although the discussions and applications of the concept of 
"mootness" in bankruptcy cases by that court had previously 
encompassed what is referred to elsewhere as "equitable 
mootness," see Specialty Equip., 3 F.3d at 1048; In re 
Andreuccetti, 975 F.2d 413, 418 (7th Cir. 1992), the court in UNR 
Industries stated it would now "banish 'equitable mootness' from 
the (local) lexicon." 20 F.3d at 769.  Instead, the court 
continued, "[w]e ask not whether this case is moot, 'equitably' 
or otherwise, but whether it is prudent to upset the plan of 
reorganization at this late date."  Id. 
         These "equitable" or "prudential" considerations focus 
on "concerns unique to bankruptcy proceedings."  Manges, 29 F.3d 
at 1038.  It is evident that "equitable mootness" is an inapt 
description of the doctrine at issue here.  Nonetheless, since 
past cases have used that term, we use it in discussing them.  
Therefore, it does not further consideration of this appeal to 
argue, as the dissent does, that we have "fallen into the trap" 
of confusing these considerations with Article III mootness. 
Whether termed "equitable mootness" or a prudence doctrine, we 
see no reason why the Third Circuit should part company with our 
sister circuits in their adoption of this doctrine.  If limited 
in scope and cautiously applied, this doctrine provides a vehicle 
whereby the court can prevent substantial harm to numerous 
parties.   
         The Trustees have not challenged the viability of the 
doctrine of equitable mootness or application of prudential 
considerations in bankruptcy cases, nor have they cited to a case 
in any circuit that rejects the concept.  Instead, they rely most 
heavily on a decision of the Second Circuit holding that even 
though the reorganization plan for the bankrupt LTV Corporation 
had been confirmed, the appeal of tax lessors challenging the 
plan's failure to give their claims administrative priority was 
not moot.  See Chateaugay II, 10 F.3d 944 (2d Cir. 1993).  
Significantly, the court in Chateaugay II did not quarrel with 
the doctrine, merely its application in that case.  In fact, in 
RTC v. Best Products Co. (In re Best Products Co.), 68 F.3d 26, 
29 (2d Cir. 1995), a more recent case from the Second Circuit, 
the court once again emphasized the language in Chateaugay I that 
even though an appeal may not be moot in the sense of Article III 
of the Constitution, it may be deemed moot in bankruptcy cases 
because of "equitable considerations." 
         We have generally stated that we exercise plenary  
review of a district court's decision on mootness.  SeeSwedeland, 16 F.3d 
at 559; Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. 
McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 1991); International Bhd. of 
Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1987).    
However, none of those cases involved a determination, like the 
one we review here, that an appeal following a consummated 
bankruptcy reorganization should be dismissed for equitable and 
prudential reasons even though some effective relief is 
available.  Surprisingly, we have seen little more than a few 
cursory references to the standard of review in the cases from 
other circuits applying this doctrine.  See AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 
at 1148 (district court's power to dismiss appeal as moot 
"discretionary"); Club Assocs., 956 F.2d at 1069 (legal 
determinations reviewed de novo, bankruptcy court's factual 
findings reviewed for clear error).    
         Because the mootness determination we review here 
involves a discretionary balancing of equitable and prudential 
factors rather than the limits of the federal courts' authority 
under Article III, using ordinary review principles we review 
that decision generally for abuse of discretion.  Cf. General 
Glass Indus. Corp. v. Monsour Medical Found., 973 F.2d 197, 200 
(3d Cir. 1992) (abstention determination reviewed under abuse of 
discretion standard); Bermuda Express, N.V. v. M/V Litsa, 872 
F.2d 554, 557 (3d Cir.) (balancing of equities involved in 
application of laches doctrine reviewed for abuse of discretion), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 819 (1989); Bennett v. White, 865 F.2d 
1395, 1402 (3d Cir.) (scope of a remedial order reviewed for 
abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989); Evans v. 
Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378-79 (3d Cir.) (in banc) (same), cert.denied, 
434 U.S. 880 (1977).  A particular case may also raise 
legal and/or factual issues interspersed with the prudential 
ones, and then the applicable review standard, plenary or clearly 
erroneous, will apply.   
         The dissent argues that the cases cited above are 
inapposite because the district court acted as an appellate court 
and that we should therefore use plenary review.  However, the 
proposition that when an appellate court reviews a lower court's 
balancing of prudential factors, it does so under an abuse of 
discretion standard as long as the factors considered are not 
inappropriate as a matter of law is a general one applicable in 
all fields, not excluding bankruptcy.  As the Fifth Circuit noted 
in a bankruptcy case: 
         In this particular case, we are reviewing the decision 
         of the district court in its capacity as an appellate 
         court.  Several different standards of review govern 
         our decision, depending on the nature of the holdings 
         reviewed.  Where the disputed holding involves a matter 
         that is within the district court's discretion, we will 
         affirm the judgment of a district court acting in its 
         appellate role unless the court has clearly abused its 
         discretion. 
 
Matter of HECI Exploration Co., Inc., 862 F.2d 513, 519 
(citations omitted). 
                                B. 
         Factors that have been considered by courts in 
determining whether it would be equitable or prudential to reach 
the merits of a bankruptcy appeal include (1) whether the 
reorganization plan has been substantially consummated, (2) 
whether a stay has been obtained, (3) whether the relief 
requested would affect the rights of parties not before the 
court, (4) whether the relief requested would affect the success 
of the plan, and (5) the public policy of affording finality to 
bankruptcy judgments.  See Manges, 29 F.3d at 1039; Rochman, 963 
F.2d at 471-72.  The Trustees have not taken issue with our 
identification of these factors.   
         Although these five factors have been given varying 
weight, depending on the particular circumstances, the foremost 
consideration has been whether the reorganization plan has been 
substantially consummated.  This is especially so where the 
reorganization involves intricate transactions, see Rochman, 963 
F.2d at 473-74 (performance under plan involved "numerous complex 
arrangements"); Roberts Farms, 652 F.2d at 797 (plan involved 
"many intricate and involved transactions" and reversal of plan's 
confirmation "would knock the props out from under" such 
transactions and "create an unmanageable, uncontrollable 
situation for the Bankruptcy Court"), or where outside investors 
have relied on the confirmation of the plan, see Manges, 29 F.3d 
at 1039 (equitable mootness "protects the interests of non- 
adverse third parties who are not before the reviewing court but 
who have acted in reliance upon the plan as implemented"); UNR 
Indus., 20 F.3d at 770 ("[b]y protecting the interests of persons 
who acquire assets in reliance on a plan of reorganization, a 
court increases the price the estate can realize ex ante, and 
thus produces benefits for creditors in the aggregate"); Rochman, 
963 F.2d at 474 (reorganization involved $1.5 billion in 
financing from 100,000 sources); Club Assocs., 956 F.2d at 1070 
("a number of investors, who were not parties to this case, had 
committed new funds to the 'reemerged Club' with the expectation 
of receiving a preferred return on their investments").  
         "Substantial consummation" is defined in the Bankruptcy 
Code as: "(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the 
property proposed by the plan to be transferred; (B) assumption 
by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under the plan of 
the business or of the management of all or substantially all of 
the property dealt with by the plan; and (C) commencement of 
distribution under the plan."  11 U.S.C.  1101(2).  In such 
instances, the strong public interest in the finality of 
bankruptcy reorganizations is particularly compelling.   
               
         The district court dismissed the Trustees' appeals to 
it as "moot" based on the conclusions, set forth in its opinion 
dated December 30, 1993, that substantial consummation of the 
Plan had occurred, the Investors had already made their $450 
million investment into the reorganized entity, all elements of 
the Plan, except distributions to the unsecured creditors, had 
been completed, and a reversal of the order confirming the Plan 
likely would put Continental back into bankruptcy.  App. at 1873.  
The court also noted that Continental had implemented the Plan 
following its approval by the court because the Trustees had 
failed to obtain a stay. 
         The Trustees do not challenge that there had been 
substantial consummation by December 1993, when the district 
court dismissed the appeals as moot.  They suggest that as their 
object is not to disturb the reorganization, but only to get 
payment from the reorganized Continental for their adequate 
protection claim measured by the market value decline of the 
collateral during bankruptcy, the line of cases upon which 
Continental relies is inapplicable.  We cannot agree, because the 
rejection of the Trustees' claim by the bankruptcy court was 
inextricably intertwined with the implementation of the 
reorganization.  See AOV Indus., 792 F.2d at 1148 (to evaluate 
mootness, court must "scrutinize each individual claim, testing 
the feasibility of granting the relief against its potential 
impact on the reorganization scheme as a whole").  Thus, the 
Trustees cannot avoid the effect of the substantial consummation 
of the reorganization plan so readily.   
         Inasmuch as Continental agrees that the issue is not 
constitutional mootness but prudential mootness, we will assume 
arguendo that even after substantial or total consummation of its 
reorganization, some effective relief would have been available 
for the Trustees' claim at the time they appealed to the district 
court, and on appeal to this court.  Even before the in banc 
court, Continental has not challenged that assumption.  It is 
quite another matter in light of the substantial, indeed 
irrevocable, change in the status quo that followed confirmation 
to determine that it would have been prudent for the court to 
reach the merits of the Trustees' claim.  For the district court 
had before it an unstayed bankruptcy reorganization plan, and 
many courts have based their prudential decisions to decline to 
consider challenges to bankruptcy court orders on the ground that 
there has been substantial consummation of a plan of 
reorganization in reliance upon an unstayed confirmation order.  
See, e.g., Rochman, 963 F.2d at 475. 
         In Chateaugay I, the court noted that although the 
Bankruptcy Code only requires a stay pending appeal in limited 
circumstances, there is a procedure under Bankruptcy Rule 8005 to 
seek to preserve the status quo and "[t]he party who appeals 
without seeking to avail himself of that protection does so at 
his own risk."  988 F.2d at 326.  And in In re Manges, the court 
observed, under the descriptive title "Halting the Runaway Train: 
the Motions to Stay," that "in many of the cases in which 
bankruptcy appeals were dismissed as moot, the appellants failed 
to seek a stay."  29 F.3d at 1039.   
         Even the seeking of a stay may not be enough.  The 
appellants in In re UNR Industries had sought a stay, albeit 
unsuccessfully, at every opportunity; nonetheless, the court 
noted, "[a] stay not sought, and a stay sought and denied, lead 
equally to the implementation of the plan of reorganization." 20 
F.3d at 770; accord AOV Indus., 792 F.2d at 1144, 1146-47. 
         Shortly after the confirmation of the Continental Plan, 
the Trustees filed an Emergency Motion for Conditional Stay of 
Order Confirming the Plan pending their appeal to the district 
court.  The condition the Trustees sought in lieu of a stay was 
the establishment of a segregated account for $117 million, the 
full amount of their adequate protection claim, or alternatively 
at least $22 million, which they claim was the admitted decline 
in the value of the collateral.  See App. at 1721.  In response 
to the district court's inquiry, they conceded that they were not 
willing to post any bond.  The district court never required a 
supersedeas bond in the amount of $450,000,000, as the Trustees 
have suggested.  In fact, the district court tried to ascertain 
the amount of bond that would be reasonable, and the Trustees' 
general position was that they were "merely the fiduciary of the 
money of their bondholders" and they suggested no lesser amount.  
App. at 1729.   
         Thus, as one of the reasons for its order denying the 
stay, the district court noted the unwillingness of the Trustees 
to post a bond satisfactory to the court.  App. at 1756.  See, 
e.g., Central States, 841 F.2d at 95 (appellant's failure to post 
bond to stay confirmation order basis for finding appeal moot).  
Because the failure to post the bond needed to get a stay 
permitted the consummation of the plan, this factor weighs 
heavily in favor of the district court's declination to delve 
into the merits of the Trustees' appeal. 
         The Trustees argue that this court has held that 
failure to obtain a stay does not necessarily render an appeal 
moot.  The cases to which they refer are not apposite.  In one, 
In re Joshua Slocum Ltd., 922 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1990), the issue 
was the narrow one of the power of the bankruptcy court to excise 
a paragraph from a shopping center lease.  There is no indication 
in Slocum that there had been any confirmation of a plan before 
or during the appeal.   
         In the more recent case to which the Trustees refer, 
Megafoods Stores, Inc. v. Flagstaff Realty Assocs. (In re 
Flagstaff Realty Assocs.), 60 F.3d 1031 (3d Cir. 1995), the 
appeal also presented a narrow landlord-tenant issue, i.e. the 
effect of confirmation of the landlord's plan on a tenant's right 
to pursue its appeal of the bankruptcy court's denial of its 
recoupment claim.  In holding that it was not necessary for the 
tenant to seek a stay in order to pursue its right to appeal 
despite the confirmation in the interim, we noted the line of 
cases placing recoupment and setoff in a special category and 
stated, "although we recognize the importance of maintaining the 
integrity of confirmed plans from later attack, these unique 
circumstances permit the plan to be reopened and readjusted."  
Id. at 1036.  Thus, neither Flagstaff nor Slocum addressed the 
equitable or prudential mootness considerations at issue here. 
          High on the list of prudential considerations taken 
into account by courts considering whether to allow an appeal 
following a consummated reorganization is the reliance by third 
parties, in particular investors, on the finality of the 
transaction.  See Manges, 29 F.3d at 1039 ("[t]he concept of 
'mootness' from a prudential standpoint protects the interests of 
non-adverse third parties who are not before the reviewing court 
but who have acted in reliance upon the plan as implemented"); 
Rochman, 963 F.3d at 474-75 (similar).  Here, the record is 
replete with evidence that the Investors relied on the bankruptcy 
court's unstayed Confirmation Order in making the decision to 
proceed to close the transaction and that an essential factor in 
that decision was the bankruptcy court's disallowance of the 
Trustees' adequate protection claim.    
         The Plan of reorganization provided that the 
reorganized Continental would pay "Allowed Administrative 
Claims."  App. at 656, 691 (Plan  5.5, 10.1).  Among the 
administrative claims that were still disputed at the time of the 
confirmation hearing were several large claims, including, in 
particular, labor claims by airline pilots, large claims by 
Eastern Airlines, and the Trustees' claim for adequate protection 
based on alleged market decline of the collateral.  App. at 1223, 
1346.  One of the concerns of the Investors that needed to be 
satisfied as a condition of their participation was that the 
total amount that would have to be paid for allowed 
administrative claims could be distorted by a few such large 
claims.  To limit their exposure, the Investment Agreement 
provided that the Investors' obligation to proceed with the 
arrangements was subject, inter alia, to the payments and 
obligations for administrative claims being no higher than a 
specified amount, or "cap."  App. at 408. 
         At the confirmation hearing, Continental's expert 
witness testified that if the claims of the Airline Pilots and 
the Trustees were excluded, the total allowed administrative 
claims payable under the Plan would be close to the cap, and that 
if the Trustees' claim were allowed, the cap would be exceeded, 
allowing the Investors to walk away from the deal.  App. at 1223- 
24, 1333-38.  Based on this testimony, Continental argued to the 
bankruptcy court that the feasibility determination required for 
confirmation under 11 U.S.C.  1129(a)(11) would turn in part on 
the adjudication of the Trustees' still outstanding 
administrative claim.  App. at 1400. Continental therefore urged 
the court to incorporate its adjudication of the Trustees' claim 
into the Confirmation Order itself, asserting that the Investors 
would not go forward with the deal "unless there is an order upon 
which they can place reliance, which is going to be a plan 
confirmation order."  App. at 1400.  The Trustees argued against 
incorporation, taking the position that even though the amount of 
the adequate protection claim allowed by the court would be 
relevant to the court's subsequent determination of feasibility, 
the adjudication of the claim itself was a separate matter from 
plan confirmation.  App. at 1401.  
         The bankruptcy court ultimately took the approach urged 
by Continental, incorporating into its Confirmation Order its 
decision denying the Trustees' adequate protection claim.  As 
part of its feasibility determination, it explicitly found that 
neither the pilots' claims nor the Eastern claims was entitled to 
administrative priority, and that the Trustees' adequate 
protection claim had no value as an administrative claim.  App. 
at 1549-51.  On that basis, it found that there was substantial, 
credible and uncontested evidence that the administrative claims 
payable at confirmation -- excluding the claims of the pilots, 
Eastern, and the Trustees -- would be within the specified limit 
of the cap set forth in the Investment Agreement, App. at 1548, 
noting that the adjudications of the Trustees' claim and the 
Eastern claims were "crucial to the willingness of the Investors 
to consummate the Financing Transaction."  App. at 1550.  
         We are unwilling to accept the Trustees' suggestion, 
implicit in their briefs and made explicit at oral argument, that 
the bankruptcy court's ruling on the merits of their adequate 
protection claim was colored by a so-called "ultimatum" from 
Continental that if the claim were granted the Investors would 
abandon the reorganization. See In Banc Argument Transcript at 3.  
The Trustees offer no evidence in support of this suggestion, and 
we certainly would not lightly impute such a motive to the 
bankruptcy court.  In effect, the Trustees are challenging the 
Investors' right to condition their investment on the amount of 
approved administrative claims.  This was never raised below at 
the time of the Investment Agreement, the ultimate confirmation 
or the period between.  We know of no statute, rule or precedent 
that would deny investors the right to limit their investments on 
the existence of conditions which they believe give the newly 
reorganized company a reasonable opportunity to succeed -- such 
as, in this case, without being weighed down by excessive 
administrative expenses. 
         The Trustees also argue that Continental's position at 
the confirmation hearing, that the adjudication of the Trustees' 
claim should be incorporated into the Confirmation Order, was a 
"ploy" to "disingenuously" use the fact of such incorporation to 
"manufactur[e] the appearance of mootness."  Appellants' Brief at 
3; In Banc Argument Transcript at 1.  Their characterization of 
Continental's position as a "ploy" implies that it had no 
legitimate reason.  In light of the integral nexus between the 
feasibility of confirmation and the adjudication of the Trustees' 
claim, it appears that the suggestion of incorporation urged by 
Continental and adopted by the bankruptcy court was reasonable 
and reflected the inescapable fact that the Trustees' claim and 
the confirmation of the Plan were inextricably intertwined, 
rather than an attempt to "manufacture" the appearance of 
equitable mootness.  
         In dismissing the Trustees' appeals as moot, the 
district court specifically found that the Investors had relied 
on the bankruptcy court's unstayed Confirmation Order and that 
there was an integral nexus between the investment and the 
success of the Plan.  The court stated, "[t]he Investors relied 
on the unstayed Confirmation Order in making the $450 million 
investment in Continental's Plan.  It is clear that [the 
Trustees'] requested relief would undermine the grounds which the 
Investors relied upon in making their investment and would 
require a dismantling of the entire Plan."  App. at 1874.  
Although the Trustees argue that this finding is erroneous, there 
is support for it in the record.   
         At the hearing in April 1993 before the district court 
on the Trustees' request for the conditional stay of the 
Confirmation Order, counsel for the Trustees stated they had 
testimony that "as a matter of business judgment, it would be 
extremely unlikely for the investors to walk away from this deal 
if . . . a 22-million-dollar deposit was established."  App. at 
1727.  The Trustees' counsel in effect challenged the Investors 
to assert otherwise, stating that inasmuch as the Investors' 
counsel were in court they could correct any assertions that he 
made.  Id.   Thereafter, the Investors' attorney rose "to make 
clear the [I]nvestors' position, which is that if the relief is 
granted to [the Trustees] which they seek from the Court this 
morning [the stay conditioned on a deposit of some $22 million to 
$117 million], then we are not prepared to close the 
transaction."  App. at 1744.   
         The representative of the Investors explained that in 
the airline business "there is a great sensitivity to cash and 
the capital structure of a reorganized entity," and that the 
relief that the Trustees sought "could significantly impair the 
capital structure that would exist with respect [to] this 
reorganized airline."  Id. at 1744-45.  He reviewed the 
negotiations that had occurred for the cap for administrative 
expense liability, advised that the Investors had monitored on a 
monthly basis Continental's performance in that respect, and 
explained that the Investors had insisted that the Confirmation 
Order address the issue of the Trustees' claim "because we want 
to make sure if we are putting our money in, we are getting the 
benefit of our bargain, which is a reorganized entity with a 
capital structure that we contemplated."  App. at 1746.  He 
concluded by stating unequivocally that if a stay were entered 
conditioned upon the bond the Trustees sought, then his client 
"would not be prepared to close this transaction."  Id.  The 
Trustees' counsel did not thereafter argue that the Investors' 
counsel's statements were insufficiently probative, and therefore 
that suggestion here is less than persuasive. 
         The Trustees have not contested here that if their 
claim for market value decline of the collateral (a claim 
independent of their claim for the use and maintenance of the 
collateral, which has been satisfied) had been approved as an 
administrative claim, the total such administrative claim would 
have greatly exceeded the cap specified by the Investors for that 
purpose.  This would have given the Investors the option to 
withdraw; such withdrawal would have placed the entire Plan in 
jeopardy.  By the time the district court ruled on the appeal, it 
was no longer possible to restore the parties to their earlier 
positions because the investment had been made, and the option to 
withdraw was no longer available to the Investors.  See Specialty 
Equip., 3 F.3d at 1049 (claim held moot when its acceptance 
"would amount to imposing a different plan of reorganization on 
the parties").  Thus, the third factor bearing on the prudential 
determination whether to reach the merits of a bankruptcy appeal 
after confirmation and in the absence of a stay -- the effect of 
the requested relief on the rights of parties not before the 
court -- weighs heavily against the Trustees. 
         This factor cannot fairly be recast as whether the 
Investors or others reasonably relied on the prediction that the 
Trustees would recover nothing on their claim.  While we agree 
that reliance of the Investors and others on the unstayed 
Confirmation Order is of central importance to our analysis, to 
focus on the "reasonableness" of that reliance, at least as 
measured by the likelihood of reversal on appeal, is necessarily 
a circular enterprise and therefore of little utility.  Whether 
the Investors were reasonable in relying on the bankruptcy 
court's order depends on whether this was a case that would be 
considered on the merits on appeal or would be dismissed on the 
basis of the doctrine often referred to as "equitable mootness."  
And whether this case would be dismissed on "equitable mootness" 
grounds on appeal in turn depends on whether the Investors 
reasonably relied.  Thus, placing the focus on the reasonableness 
of the Investors' reliance as measured by the probability that 
Continental would prevail on appeal sets up a straw man which is 
easily knocked down.     
         Our inquiry should not be about the "reasonableness" of 
the Investors' reliance or the probability of either party 
succeeding on appeal.  Rather, we should ask whether we want to 
encourage or discourage reliance by investors and others on the 
finality of bankruptcy confirmation orders.  The strong public 
policy in favor of maximizing debtors' estates and facilitating 
successful reorganization, reflected in the Code itself, clearly 
weighs in favor of encouraging such reliance.  Indeed, the 
importance of allowing approved reorganizations to go forward in 
reliance on bankruptcy court confirmation orders may be the 
central animating force behind the equitable mootness doctrine.  
See Rochman, 963 F.2d at 471-72; Metro Property Mgmt. Co. v. 
Information Dialogues, Inc. (In re Information Dialogues, Inc.), 
662 F.2d 475, 477 (8th Cir. 1981).  Where, as here, investors and 
other third parties consummated a massive reorganization in 
reliance on an unstayed confirmation order that, explicitly and 
as a condition of feasibility, denied the claim for which 
appellate review is sought, the allowance of such appellate 
review would likely undermine public confidence in the finality 
of bankruptcy confirmation orders and make successful completion 
of large reorganizations like this more difficult.  This is true 
regardless of whether the Investors' reliance was "reasonable" or 
based on a 30%, 60%, or 100% probability of success on appeal, an 
issue raised at the oral argument.                
         In arguing against dismissal here on the basis of 
prudential considerations, the Trustees repeatedly rely on their 
assertion that the Plan contained "a built-in mechanism for the 
[post-confirmation] disposition and payment of Disputed 
Administrative Claims."  Appellants' Brief at 10.  On the basis 
of this provision, they argue that they had no obligation to take 
steps to preserve the status quo through a stay, that their 
appeal is not moot because "some effective relief" is available, 
and that the Plan is contractually "binding" on Continental.  
They conclude that the district court therefore erred in 
"permitt[ing] Continental to escape its 'contractual' obligations 
under the Plan under the guise of the mootness doctrine."  
Appellant's Brief at 20.  While the Trustees' description of the 
"mechanism" provided in the Plan is technically correct, they 
overstate the impact of that mechanism. 
         Under the definitions in the Plan, the Trustees' claim 
was a "Disputed Administrative Claim" because it sought adequate 
protection payments, see App. at 623-24 (Plan  1.4(vi)) and was 
the subject of a timely objection, see App. at 632 (Plan  
1.85(a)).  The Plan requires the reorganized Continental to pay 
allowed administrative claims on the later of:  the effective 
date of confirmation or "the fifth Business Day after such Claim 
is Allowed."  App. at 691 (Plan  10.1).  Further, the Plan 
provides that "[a] Disputed Claim shall be an Allowed Claim if, 
and only to the extent that, such Disputed Claim has been Allowed 
by a Final Order," App. at 623 (Plan  1.5), and defines a "Final 
Order" as "[a]n order which is no longer subject to appeal, 
certiorari proceeding or other proceeding for review or 
rehearing, and as to which no [such proceeding is] pending," App. 
at 635 (Plan  1.100).  
         Thus, the Plan imposes an obligation on the reorganized 
Continental to pay disputed administrative claims once they 
become allowed by a final order of court, even if such final 
order does not occur until after confirmation.  If the bankruptcy 
court's disallowance of the Trustees' claim were to be reversed 
on appeal, the Plan appears to provide a "mechanism" for payment 
of the claim by the reorganized Continental.  The mere 
availability of such a mechanism, however, which may prevent 
dismissal on the ground of Article III constitutional mootness, 
does not warrant reversal of the district court's order 
dismissing it on prudential grounds.  As we have noted, the 
district court's "mootness" determination was based not on a 
finding that no effective relief was available, but rather on the 
finding that in light of all the circumstances, it would be 
inequitable to grant relief.  Nor has any "contractual 
obligation" been violated either by Continental or the district 
court.  Where, as here, there has been no order, final or 
otherwise, allowing the Trustees' disputed administrative claim, 
the Plan imposes no obligation on the reorganized Continental to 
pay it.    
         Finally, the Plan provisions allowing for post- 
confirmation payment of allowed claims in no way obviated the 
Trustees' obligation to seek a stay.  Here, where the 
confirmation of the Plan and the willingness of the Investors to 
go forward turned on the bankruptcy court's denial of the 
Trustees' claims, and where the denial of those claims was in 
fact incorporated into the Confirmation Order, there was a clear 
possibility that the Trustees' claims would become moot after 
consummation of the Plan, and it was therefore incumbent on the 
Trustees to obtain a stay.  Indeed, the record shows that all 
parties were well aware of the extensive legal precedent 
dismissing as moot or on equitable grounds appeals from unstayed 
consummated reorganizations.  See App. at 410 (references in the 
Investment Agreement); App. at 1729-30, 1741 (argument before the 
district court on the stay). 
         For similar reasons, we fail to see the inconsistency  
charged by the Trustees between Continental's current position  
as to "equitable mootness" and its argument to the bankruptcy 
court in response to the Trustees' Deposit Motion that the Plan 
would require payment of the Trustees' claim by the reorganized 
Continental if and when allowed.  See App. at 1039.  As noted 
above, the Plan imposes no obligation on Continental in the 
absence of a final order allowing the Trustees' claim, and the 
mere availability of a mechanism for granting relief does not  
mean the court cannot determine that in light of all the 
circumstances it should not even try to unscramble the eggs. 
         Moreover, at the time Continental argued against the 
Deposit Motion the bankruptcy court had not yet ruled disallowing 
the Trustees' claim nor cited that as an explicit basis for its 
feasibility determination in confirming the plan.  Accordingly, 
Continental did not yet have reason to know that the claim would 
be denied and become subject to "equitable mootness" on appeal.  
As soon as the basis for this mootness argument became apparent, 
Continental repeatedly asserted its intention to make such an 
argument if an appeal was filed and no stay obtained.  App. at 
1691, 1742.  
         The Trustees have not presented us with any arguments 
which would weigh against all of the prudential considerations 
that dictate that this consummated reorganization must be left in 
place.  Following confirmation, Continental was operating as a 
restructured company, and had entered into countless new 
relationships and transactions.  To convince a court to take the 
action sought by the Trustees which would undermine the basis for 
the Investors' decision to proceed, the Trustees would have to 
proffer a powerful reason indeed.  They have not even attempted 
to do so.   
         Arrayed against that silence are the facts that the 
reorganization plan was consummated, no stay was obtained, 
numerous other parties have changed their positions, and numerous 
irrevocable transactions have since been completed as a result of 
the consummation of the Plan.  Without listing all of such 
transactions set forth by Continental in its brief, we note that 
among those are the distribution to unsecured creditors, the 
merger of 53 debtors other than Continental with and into 
Continental, the investment of $110 million in cash by Air 
Partners and Air Canada in the reorganized Continental, the 
transfer by foreign governments of various route authorities, and 
the assumption by the reorganized Continental of unexpired leases 
and executory contracts worth over $5.0 billion.  Thus, the key 
issue really is whether the district court abused its discretion 
in weighing the various equitable factors.  We are not prepared 
to hold that the balance reached by the district court was an 
abuse of its discretion.  
         Under the circumstances presented here, we can see no 
prudential considerations that would support an attempt by an 
appellate court, district or court of appeals, to fashion even a 
limited remedy for the Trustees.  That would necessarily entail 
imposing a new debt on the reorganized company, which is a 
different entity than it was when this case was before the 
district court.  Thus, we agree with the determination of the 
district court to dismiss the Trustees' claim.  We base our 
holding on our conclusion that it would be neither prudent nor 
equitable to grant the Trustees the relief they seek. 
                               III. 
                            CONCLUSION 
         For the reasons set forth we will affirm the order of 
the district court. 
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         The majority's decision in this case creates a bad 
precedent for our circuit.  The majority adopts the curious 
doctrine of "equitable mootness," which it interprets as 
permitting federal district courts and courts of appeals to 
refuse to entertain the merits of live bankruptcy appeals over 
which they indisputably possess statutory jurisdiction and in 
which they can plainly provide relief.  According to the 
majority, there is no clear rule for determining when a 
bankruptcy appeal is "equitably moot."  Instead, this is said to 
be a discretionary determination to be made in the first instance 
by the district court based on a weighing of five factors that 
the majority has culled from the opinions of our "sister 
circuits."  In my view, if the doctrine of "equitable mootness" 
has any validity, it is more limited than the majority holds.  
          The dangers inherent in the majority's adoption and 
broad interpretation of this doctrine are illustrated by this 
case.  In simple terms, this is what happened.  After filing for 
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Continental 
Airlines continued to use certain aircraft and jet engines that 
were held as collateral entrusted to the Trustees.  Believing 
that their collateral was undergoing a dramatic diminution in 
value, the Trustees in August 1992 filed a renewed motion in the 
bankruptcy court seeking "adequate protection" under 11 U.S.C.  
363(e).  During the next eight months, while the Continental 
reorganization plan proceeded toward confirmation, the bankruptcy 
court did not rule on this motion.  In March 1993, Continental 
insisted that the bankruptcy court rule on the Trustees' motion 
at the same time that it confirmed the plan, and Continental told 
the bankruptcy judge that unless the motion was denied, the 
prospective investors in the reorganized corporation would 
withhold funding, and the reorganization would not go forward.  
See Continental Br. at 5-6 & n.1.  Furthermore, Continental took 
the position that if the plan was confirmed and went into effect, 
any appeal would be moot.  See Continental Br. at 21.  The 
bankruptcy court then simultaneously denied the Trustees' motion 
and entered the order confirming the plan.  The Trustees 
exercised their statutory right to appeal to the district court, 
and in my view the need for review by an Article III court is 
particularly acute when the challenged ruling of the bankruptcy 
court is made under circumstances such as these. 
         The Trustees, however, have been utterly denied such 
review.  In the initial level of appeal, the district court 
opined that the Trustees probably would have won if the merits of 
their appeal had been reached (JA 1755-56), but the district 
court dismissed their appeal as moot.  Likewise, the majority of 
our court describes the Trustees' arguments as "interesting and 
challenging" (Maj. Op. at 9) but then throws them out of court 
without reaching the merits of their arguments.  And the majority 
does this even though (a) this case is clearly not "moot" in any 
proper sense of the term, (b) we unquestionably have statutory 
jurisdiction, and (c) we have a "virtually unflagging obligation" 
to exercise the jurisdiction that we have been given.  Colorado 
River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 
817 (1976).  I am puzzled and troubled by what the majority has 
done.   
 
                                    I. 
 
         As the majority notes, the Trustees have not contested 
the existence of the doctrine of "equitable mootness," and in 
light of the Trustees' position, I think that it is appropriate 
to assume the existence of this doctrine for purposes of this 
appeal.  The majority opinion, however, does not simply assume 
the existence of this doctrine but adopts it as part of the law 
of our circuit.  In doing so, the majority does not undertake an 
independent analysis of the origin or scope of the doctrine but 
is instead content to rely on the decisions of other courts of 
appeals.  From these decisions, the majority extracts five 
factors, which are to be weighed by the district court in the 
initial level of appeal for the purpose of determining whether 
the appeal is "equitably moot."  Maj. Op. at 14.  These factors 
are: "(1) whether the reorganization plan has been substantially 
consummated, (2) whether a stay has been obtained, (3) whether 
the relief requested would affect the rights of parties not 
before the court, (4) whether the relief requested would affect 
the success of the plan, and (5) the public policy of affording 
finality to bankruptcy judgments."  Maj. Op. at 15. 
         I am not convinced that the majority's test is 
consistent with the law of all of the circuits that the majority 
claims to be following.  For example, the Eleventh Circuit holds 
that the proper test is "whether the `reorganization plan has 
been so substantially consummated that effective relief is no 
longer available.'"  In re Club Associates, 956 F.2d 1065, 1069 
(11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Miami Center Ltd. Partnership v. Bank 
of New York, 820 F.2d 376, 379 (11th Cir. 1987)).  This inquiry 
seems quite different from the majority's indeterminate five- 
factor test.  But even if the majority's analysis is supported by 
the decisions it cites, and even though I think that those 
decisions deserve careful and respectful consideration, I think 
that the in banc majority should have made an independent 
examination of the basis and scope of the doctrine of "equitable 
mootness" before engraving it in our circuit's law. 
         What is the basis of this doctrine?  As the majority 
acknowledges, it does not stem from the "case-or-controversy" 
requirement of Article III.  See Maj. Op. at 10.  For example, it 
is not argued that the case now before us is moot in the Article 
III sense. 
         Nor does it appear that this doctrine is rooted in non- 
Article III mootness decisions "reflect[ing] avowedly flexible 
doctrines of remedy and judicial administration."  13A Charles 
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure  3533.1 at 222 (1984).  These doctrines 
are said to focus on the question whether "granting a present 
determination of the issues offered, and perhaps the entry of 
more specific orders, will have some effect in the real world."  
Id. at  3533.1 at 226 (footnote omitted).  Here, it is clear 
that a determination of the merits of the issues raised by the 
Trustees and the entry of a remedial order on the basis of such a 
determination would have "some effect" -- and potentially quite a 
substantial effect -- in the real world.  (That is precisely why 
Continental does not want us to entertain the appeal!)   
          
         Thus, as this case well illustrates, the doctrine of 
"equitable mootness" is not really about "mootness" at all in 
either the Article III or non-Article III sense.  As the Seventh 
Circuit stated in a passage that the majority quotes with 
approval (see Maj. Op. at 12), "[t]here is a big difference 
between inability to alter the outcome (real mootness) and 
unwillingness to alter the outcome (`equitable mootness').  Using 
one word for two different concepts breeds confusion."  In re UNR 
Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir.) (emphasis in original), 
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 509 (1994).   
         If the doctrine of "equitable mootness" is not based on 
real mootness principles, on what is it based?  The cases cited 
by the majority and the parties suggest two possible answers.   
         The first is provided by the earliest court of appeals 
decision cited by the majority, In re Roberts Farms, Inc., 652 
F.2d 793, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1981), and several others.  See In re 
AOV Industries, Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1986); In re 
Information Dialogues, Inc., 662 F.2d 475, 477 (8th Cir. 1981).  
The modest authority on which the Roberts Farms court relied was 
a provision of former Bankruptcy Rule 805, which concerned stays 
pending appeal.  Added by a 1976 amendment to the rule, the 
provision in question stated: 
         Unless an order approving a sale of property 
         or issuance of a certificate of indebtedness 
         is stayed pending appeal, the sale to a good 
         faith purchaser or the issuance of a 
         certificate to a good faith holder shall not 
         be affected by the reversal or modification 
         of such order on appeal, whether or not the 
         purchaser or holder knows of the pendency of 
         the appeal. 
 
         Although I do not find the Roberts Farms opinion 
entirely clear, I think that the best reading of the opinion is 
that the challenge to the plan of reorganization in that case 
could not be entertained because no relief was practicable as a 
result of the many post-confirmation transactions that were 
irreversible due to this provision of former Rule 805.  See 652 
F.2d at 797.  In any event, whether or not this is what the 
Roberts Farms court meant to say, I do not see how any broader 
rule could reasonably be extracted from the provision of former 
Bankruptcy Rule 805 on which the Roberts Farms court relied or 
from the analogous provisions now contained in 11 U.S.C.  
363(m) and 364(e).  If one begins with narrow provisions such as 
these -- which merely prevent the upsetting of certain specific 
transactions if stays are not obtained -- I do not see how one 
can derive the broad doctrine of "equitable mootness" that the 
majority in this case appears to embrace.   
         What apparently happened, however, was that the holding 
of Roberts Farms was gradually extended well beyond anything that 
could be supported by the authority on which Roberts Farmsrested.  
Subsequent cases first cited Roberts Farms in support of 
the proposition that a bankruptcy appeal cannot be entertained if 
the court could not grant "effective relief."  See, e.g., In re 
Information Dialogues, Inc., 662 F.2d at 477.  Later, Roberts 
Farms was interpreted more expansively to mean that an appeal 
could not be entertained if a court could not award relief that 
was "equitable."  See In re Chateaugay Corp., 988 F.2d 322, 324 
(2d Cir. 1993) (citing Roberts Farms).  And this latter holding 
figures prominently in the majority's analysis.  See Maj. Op. at 
12.  In my view, this gradual but ultimately quite substantial 
extension of Roberts Farms cannot be squared with the narrow 
authority on which that decision relied.  Accordingly, if 
anything like the majority's decision in this case is to be 
defended, some other foundation for the doctrine of "equitable 
mootness" must be found. 
         The second possible basis for the doctrine of 
"equitable mootness" is suggested in In re UNR Indus., supra, 
where the Seventh Circuit wrote: 
              Several provisions of the Bankruptcy 
         Code of 1978 provide that courts should keep 
         their hands off consummated transactions.  
         For example, 11 U.S.C.  363(m) says that the 
         reversal of an order authorizing the sale or 
         lease of property of an estate "does not 
         affect the validity of a sale or lease under 
         such authorization to an entity that 
         purchased or leased such property in good 
         faith, whether or not such entity knew of the 
         pendency of the appeal."  Unless the sale is 
         stayed pending appeal, the transaction 
         survives even if it should not have been 
         authorized in the first place.  See In re 
         Sax, 796 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1986); cf. In re 
         Edwards, 962 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1992) 
         (concluding that  363(m) does not, however, 
         forbid all forms of collateral attack).  
         Another section of the Code, 11 U.S.C.  
         1127(b), dramatically curtails the power of a 
         bankruptcy court to modify a plan of 
         reorganization after its confirmation and 
         "substantial consummation."  Section 1127(b), 
         unlike  363(m), does not place any limit on 
         the power of the court of appeals, but the 
         reasons underlying  363(m) and 1127(b) -- 
         preserving interests bought and paid for in 
         reliance on judicial decisions, and avoiding 
         the pains that attend any effort to 
         unscramble an egg -- are so plain and so 
         compelling that courts fill the interstices 
         of the Code with the same approach. 
 
20 F.3d at 769.  Thus, the court seemed to say that the 
Bankruptcy Code contains an "interstice" -- a gap -- regarding 
the circumstances under which an appeal that might upset a plan 
of reorganization may be pursued.  Further, the court appeared to 
suggest that the federal courts have the authority to create a 
rule of federal common law to fill this gap.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580, 593 
(1973) (referring to the "`power in the federal courts to 
declare, as a matter of common law or "judicial legislation," 
rules which may be necessary to fill in interstitially or 
otherwise effectuate the statutory patterns enacted in the large 
by Congress'") (citation omitted). 
         This is an interesting theory, but I find it 
unnecessary to decide in this case whether it is correct.  For 
present purposes, what is important is to note that, even if this 
theory is correct, it has nothing to do with mootness.  Instead, 
it concerns a federal common law rule designed to promote certain 
policies of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  These policies 
are the facilitation of reorganizations and the protection of 
those who reasonably rely on reorganization plans.  As I explain 
below, neither of these policies justifies what has happened in 
this case -- the refusal of the Article III courts to entertain a 
live appeal over which they indisputably possess statutory 
jurisdiction and in which meaningful relief can be awarded.  
  
                                    II. 
          A.  How can the objective of preserving the Continental 
reorganization justify what the majority has done?  The Trustees 
are not seeking to upset the plan of reorganization; rather, they 
are attempting to obtain payments that they claim are due to them 
pursuant to that plan.  Moreover, even if the success of the 
reorganization might be imperilled if the Trustees obtained the 
full relief that they are seeking -- an empirical proposition 
that is not self-evident -- the courts could surely fashion some 
measure of lesser relief that would not disturb the 
reorganization.  In order to justify its decision, which slams 
the courthouse door on the Trustees before they are even heard on 
the merits, the majority would have to show that the Trustees 
could not be awarded any relief -- not one dollar -- without 
upsetting the Continental reorganization, and obviously they 
cannot do any such thing.  I do not dispute the desirability of 
preserving the Continental reorganization, but to my mind this 
objective implicates a question of remedy, to be decided after 
the merits of the Trustees' arguments are addressed, and not a 
threshold question of "mootness." 
         In treating this as a threshold question, the majority, 
I believe, has been confused by the misleading term "equitable 
mootness," which, as I have discussed, does not actually involve 
mootness at all.  The federal courts are accustomed to 
considering questions of Article III mootness, and the majority, 
in my view, has fallen into the trap of thinking that the 
question of "equitable mootness" that is now before us must be 
treated as if it were a question of Article III mootness.  
Whether a case is moot in the Article III sense is, of course, a 
jurisdictional question, see, e.g., Rosetti v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 
1216, 1223 (3d Cir. 1993), and therefore it is a question that we 
are obligated to resolve before we consider the merits of an 
appeal.  See, e.g., United Wire Metal and Machine Health and 
Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179, 1190 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382 (1993); Rogin v. Bensalem 
Tp., 616 F.2d 680, 684 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
1029 (1981).  Moreover, if we conclude that an appeal is moot in 
this sense, we have little remedial flexibility; we generally 
have no choice but to dismiss.  See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage 
Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386, 389-90 (1994); 
Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895) (when "an event occurs 
which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide 
the case in favor of the plaintiff, to grant him any effectual 
relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, 
but will dismiss the appeal"). 
         By contrast, the doctrine that is involved here -- 
which is not really a doctrine of mootness at all -- does not 
demand or justify similar treatment.  It does not present a 
jurisdictional question; we are not required to consider it 
before proceeding to the merits; and even if we find that it is 
applicable, it does not necessarily dictate that we dismiss the 
appeal or affirm in its entirety a district court order of 
dismissal.  Rather, we retain the ability to craft, or to 
instruct the district or bankruptcy courts to craft, a remedy 
that is suited to the particular circumstances of the case.  
Thus, a remedy could be fashioned in the present case to ensure 
that the Continental reorganization is not undermined. 
         B.  Much the same is true with respect to the objective 
of protecting reasonable reliance interests.  In my opinion, this 
is also a remedial consideration; if the Trustees win on the 
merits, the need to protect reasonable reliance interests can be 
fully taken into account in crafting an appropriate remedy.  I 
thus see no need to resolve the question of reasonable reliance 
interests at this time. 
         The majority, however, not only wrongly treats this as 
a threshold, rather than a remedial, consideration, but engages 
in an analysis that flies in the face of the language of the plan 
and seems to assume an extraordinary degree of naivete on the 
part of the Investors and the others who are said to have relied 
on the plan.   
         I will focus on the Investors because their plight 
looms large in the majority's analysis.  When the Investors 
decided to invest in the reorganized company, NewCal, they knew 
or should have known that under the reorganization plan NewCal 
would be required to pay the Trustees' claim if it was ultimately 
allowed.  Section 10.1 of the plan provided that NewCal would pay 
"Allowed Administrative Claims."  Moreover, in order to persuade 
the bankruptcy court to reject the Trustees' request that a cash 
reserve be established prior to confirmation to cover their 
claim, Continental argued that such a reserve was unnecessary 
because if the Trustees' claim was allowed it would be "an 
Allowed Administrative Claim which would be paid in accordance 
with the terms of Section 10.1 of the Plan."  JA 1039.   Under 
these circumstances, any prudent investor, in deciding whether to 
invest in NewCal on particular terms, would have taken into 
account the range and likelihood of possible outcomes in the 
Trustees' appeal, including the possibility that some or all of 
the amount sought by the Trustees would have to be paid as an 
administrative claim pursuant to Section 10.1 of the plan.  No 
reasonable investor would have proceeded on the assumption that 
the Trustees would definitely recover nothing.  And the same is 
true of the other parties that relied on the plan.   Thus, I am 
skeptical about the reliance interests that are claimed here, but 
in any event I fail to see why this issue needs to be resolved at 
the threshold of this case rather than at the remedial stage, if 
that stage is ever reached. 
         C.  One final aspect of the majority opinion warrants a 
response, and that is the majority's discussion of the Trustees' 
failure to seek or obtain a stay.  I have two comments regarding 
this discussion.  
         First, while it might be desirable to have a rule that 
flatly requires a stay whenever a party takes an appeal that 
might upset a plan of reorganization, neither the Bankruptcy Code 
nor the Bankruptcy Rules contain any such sweeping provision; our 
court had not adopted any such rule at the time of the Trustees' 
appeal (and, indeed, still has not done so); and it would 
consequently be unfair to apply such a rule to the Trustees  
retroactively.   
         Second, in the absence of such a blanket rule, we 
should focus on whether the purposes that would be served by a 
stay require that the Trustees be thrown out of court at the 
threshold.  The purpose of a stay in this context is to prevent 
transactions that might otherwise occur in reliance on the plan 
of reorganization and that would be difficult or painful to undo 
if the appeal were to succeed.  Accordingly, the Trustees' 
failure to obtain a stay in this case might limit the relief that 
would be available to them if they succeeded on the merits of 
their appeal, but it cannot justify the refusal at the outset 
even to consider their arguments. 
         In sum, I believe that the Trustees' claim should be 
entertained on the merits.  The mere act of entertaining that 
claim would not imperil Continental's reorganization or impair 
any legitimate reliance interests.  If the Trustees' claim were 
considered and they won on the merits, any threat to the 
reorganization or to legitimate reliance interests could be taken 
into account in framing the Trustees' relief.  What the district 
court and the majority have done -- throwing the Trustees out of 
court before the merits of their claim are even heard -- is 
unjustified and unjust.           
         For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.  I would 
reverse the order of the district court and remand for a decision 
on the merits.   
